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GENDER CONFUSION: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE 
LEGISLATION TO PROTECT AGAINST GENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine interviewing for a job for which you are fully qualified. 1 
The process goes well, and you receive the highest interview score 
amongst all of the applicants.2 Ultimately, the employer offers you 
the job because you are '"significantly better than the other 
candidates,"' and you accept it. 3 At this point, you choose to disclose 
private information about yourself to your future employer, including 
details about medical procedures that you are currently undergoing 
and will undergo in the future. 4 The procedures do not affect your 
ability to perform the functions of your job.5 Nevertheless, because 
of this conversation and the information you choose to disclose, the 
employer rescinds the offer of employment.6 It may seem far-fetched 
that an employer can or will rescind a job offer based solely upon 
one's private life or medical treatments. However, under both 
Maryland7 and federal8 law, transgendered individuals may be 
subjected to such employment action if they disclose their 
transgendered status to a current or potential employer.9 
The situation described above is precisely what Diane Schroer 10 
experienced after interviewing for a position with the Library of 
Congress. 11 Charlotte Preece, who initially offered Schroer the job, 
recanted the offer after a lunch meeting where Schroer disclosed her 
I. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008). 
2. See id. at 296. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. at 296-97. 
5. See id. at 302. 
6. See id. at 299. 
7. See infra Part Vl.A. 
8. See infra Part III. C. 
9. See, e.g., Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 299. 
10. Ms. Schroer was born a genetic male named David Schroer. /d. at 295. At the time of 
the incident she had not yet transitioned from male to female. /d. However, she filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as "Diane J. 
Schroer." /d. at 293. As such, she will be referred to using the feminine pronoun. 
For purposes of this Comment, all transgendered individuals will be referred to by 
their preferred gender identity, regardless of their biological sex at birth. 
II. See id. at 295. 
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status as transgendered. 12 By Preece's own admission, it was 
Schroer's decision to transition from male to female that raised 
concerns about hiring her. 13 Although the District Court ultimately 
ruled in Schroer's favor under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,14 it is unclear whether the statute actually required the court to 
find unlawful discrimination on the part of the Library of Congress. 15 
Furthermore, the statute does not explicitly prohibit discrimination 
against transgendered individuals. 16 
Diane Schroer is not the only person to experience employment 
discrimination due to gender identity. 17 Federal appellate courts 
encountered claims of gender identity discrimination as early as 
1977. 18 Initially, there was little question as to whether Title VII 19 
protected individuals against gender identity discrimination - it did 
not. 20 In 1989, however, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII in a 
way that made some courts re-evaluate their position on gender 
identity discrimination under the statute.21 In Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 22 the Supreme Court determined for the first time that Title 
VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex also 
prevented employers from engaging in sex stereotyping.23 This 
interpretation resulted in new litigation that forced the federal circuits 
to reconsider the issue of whether Title VII provides protection 
against gender identity discrimination in employment.24 
This Comment will evaluate the current status of gender identity 
discrimination in employment. It will first discuss the various 
12. Jd. at 296. 
13. Jd. at 297. 
14. Jd. at 308. The court relied upon the Sixth Circuit's holding that discrimination on the 
basis of an individual's transgendered status constitutes sex stereotyping and is 
prohibited under the rationale of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 303. It further found that the Library's decision to rescind 
Schroer's job offer "was literally discrimination 'because of ... sex."' I d. at 308. 
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006); see also infra Part III. 
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
I 7. See infra Part III. 
18. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
20. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that Title VII does not prohibit employers from 
terminating employees due to their decision to undergo gender reassignment. 
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664. 
21. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
22. Jd. 
23. I d. at 250. See also infra Part III.B (discussing the scope of Title VII in the Court's 
decision). 
24. See infra Part III.C. 
2009] Gender Confusion: The Need for Effective Legislation 139 
meanings of gender identity/5 as well as how federae6 and state 
legislation27 has responded to claims of gender identity 
discrimination. It will then focus on how the State of Maryland has 
addressed this issue by evaluating legislation proposed in the 
Maryland General Assembly, as well as ordinances enacted in cities 
and counties in the state. 28 
In defining gender identity discrimination, Part II of this Comment 
will first examine the word "transgender" as a social and medical 
concept.29 A common misconception is that only those who have 
undergone medical treatment to change their physical sex are 
transgendered.30 The term actually encompasses a far more diverse 
group.31 This Comment will further explain the ways in which 
employers engage in either overt or subtle gender identity 
discrimination. 32 Some employers engage in adverse action against 
transgendered individuals in an open manner, acknowledging that 
their decisions are motivated by an employee or potential employee's 
gender identity.33 More often, however, employers give neutral 
explanations for their discriminatory actions. 34 
After explaining basic concepts related to gender identity, this 
Comment will evaluate the legal response to gender identity 
discrimination at the federal level. 35 Part III will examine the federal 
protection that is, debatably, currently provided against gender 
identity discrimination. Specifically, Title VII's prohibition against 
sex discrimination will be evaluated in light of the Supreme Court's 
1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,36 which held that sex 
discrimination exists where an employer engages in sex 
stereotyping. 37 At present, the federal circuits are split in their 
determination as to whether Title VII similarly prohibits 
discrimination against transgendered individuals. 38 This Comment 
25. See infra Part Il.A. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See infra Part V. 
28. See infra Part VI. 
29. See infra Part II.A. 
30. See Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 
16, 2002). 
31. /d. 
32. See infra Part II.B. 
33. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D.D.C. 2008). 
34. See, e.g., Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1083-84 (7th Cir. 2000). 
35. See infra Part III. 
36. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
37. /d. at 250. 
38. See infra Part III. C. 
140 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
will examine this divide in order to evaluate the strength of Title VII 
based gender identity protection in the circuits that have addressed 
the issue. 39 
The Supreme Court has not provided explicit guidance as to 
whether Title VII prohibits gender identity discrimination.40 
Congress, however, has attempted to clarify the issue through new 
legislation.41 Part IV of this Comment will discuss two efforts in the 
House of Representatives to pass an Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).42 The first act would have explicitly 
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of an individual's 
"actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity."43 The 
amended ENDA contained lesser protection than its predecessor.44 If 
enacted, it would have prohibited employment discrimination on the 
basis of an individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation.45 It 
would not, however, have granted explicit protection to 
transgendered individuals.46 This Comment will discuss the current 
status of each proposed bill.47 It will then evaluate the impact of each 
bill, as well as each proposed bill's potential implications for the 
transgendered community. 48 
After discussing gender identity discrimination under federal law, 
this Comment will examine legal responses to the issue at the state 
and local level. 49 At present, thirteen states and the District of 
Columbia have statutes expressly prohibiting gender identity 
discrimination in employment.50 In many areas without state-level 
39. See infra Part III.C. 
40. See Darrell R. VanDeusen, VanDeusen on Gender Identity Discrimination: Gender 
Identity Issues Under Title VII, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARIES, October 26, 
2007, available at 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 793 (2007). 
41. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 2015, llOth Cong. (2007); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
42. See H.R. 2015; H.R. 3685; see also infra Part IV. 
43. H.R. 2015 § 4(a)(1)-{2). 
44. Compare H.R. 3685 (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of actual or 
perceived sexual orientation), with H.R. 2015 (prohibiting employment discrimination 
based on actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity). 
45. H.R. 3685. 
46. See H.R. 3685. 
47. See infra Part IV. 
48. See infra Part IV. 
49. See infra Part V. 
50. NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK fORCE, JURISDICTIONS WITH EXPLICITLY 
TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS (2008), http://www.the 
taskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_ sheets/all jurisdictions_ w _pop_ 8 _ 08.pd( As of 
August of 2008, the states explicitly barring gender identity discrimination in 
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protection, city and county legislatures have assumed the task of 
granting necessary protection to transgendered persons.51 Part V of 
this Comment will evaluate state and local transgender discrimination 
prohibitions, analyzing their strength and effectiveness. 52 
Finally, this Comment will focus on legislation in the State of 
Maryland. 53 Laws passed first in Baltimore City,54 and more recently 
in Montgomery County,55 both contain language barring employers 
from discriminating against employees and applicants on the basis of 
their gender identities. 56 Part VI will discuss recent attempts by the 
Maryland General Assembly to prohibit gender identity 
discrimination. To date, the Maryland legislature has not followed 
the example of other states and its own local jurisdictions;57 no state-
level legislation expressly protects individuals against gender identity 
discrimination.58 Maryland must amend its current anti-
discrimination laws to adequately protect the transgendered 
community. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
A. Gender Identity 
Gender identity, simply stated, is an individual's "personal sense of 
being male or female. "59 Although it most often coincides with a 
person's biological sex, such is not always the case. A transgendered 
individual is one whose biological sex and psychological gender 
employment include: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. !d. 
51. !d. 
52. See infra Part V. 
53. See infra Part VI. 
54. See BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 1-l(f) (2009). 
55. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009). On November 13, 2007, 
the Montgomery County Council unanimously enacted Bill 23-07. MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY BILL 23-07 (2007). This new legislation expanded upon previous statutes 
which included sexual orientation, but not gender identity, as a protected class. /d. 
56. See BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4 § 1-l(f) (2009); Montgomery County Bill 23-
07 (2007). 
57. The Maryland Constitution allows jurisdictions within its borders to obtain charters, 
allowing them to enact local laws relating to matters designated in their charters. See 
Mo. CONST. art. 11-A, § 3. Home rule jurisdictions can extend protection to 
individuals in the locality beyond that provided by the state. !d. 
58. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-606 (LexisNexis 2009). 
59. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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identity do not match.60 The term "transgender" is a broad one which 
encompasses historically familiar concepts such as transsexuality61 
and transvestitism, 62 as well as modern constructs such as 
transgenderism. 63 
In addition to social ideas attached to the concept, gender identity is 
recognized and evaluated from a medical standpoint.64 The American 
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders {DSM) recognizes Gender Identity Disorder (GID) 
as a legitimate medical diagnosis. 65 It sets forth specific diagnostic 
criteria which must be met to substantiate such a diagnosis: 
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not 
merely a desire for any perceived cultural advantages of 
being the other sex). In children, the disturbance is 
manifested by four (or more) of the following: 
1. repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence that he 
or she is, the other sex 
2. in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating 
female attire; in girls, insistence on wearing only 
stereotypical masculine clothing 
60. See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2; see also Paisley Currah, Gender Pluralisms 
Under the Transgender Umbrella, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 3-4 (Paisley Currah, 
Richard M. Juang, & Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006). 
61. See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transsexual is defined as being "a person who 
strongly identifies with the opposite sex and may seek to live as a member of this sex 
especially by undergoing surgery and hormone therapy to obtain the necessary 
physical appearance (as by changing the external sex organs)." MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY (2009), http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transsexual 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
62. See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transvestite is an individual, often male, who 
"adopts the dress and often the behavior typical of the opposite sex especially for 
purposes of emotional or sexual gratification." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE 
DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transvestite (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
63. See VanDeusen, supra note.40, at 2. Transgenderism occurs when a person lives full-
time in the gender opposite his or her biological sex. See Jessica Xavier, A Primer by 
Transgender Nation (Feb. 25, 2007), available at http://www.critpath.org/plaf-
talk/tgprimer.htrn. Transgenderists differ from transexuals in that transgenderists, 
although living as the opposite gender, often have no desire to undergo surgical 
gender reassignment. !d. Transgenderists also differ from transvestites, as 
transvestites generally dress or behave as the opposite gender for sexual or emotional 
gratification, and do not live full-time as that gender. Id. 
64. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 306. 
65. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 576-82 (4th ed., text rev. 2000). 
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3. strong and persistent preferences for cross-sex roles 
in make-believe play or persistent fantasies of being 
the other sex 
4. intense desire to participate in the stereotypical 
games and pastimes of the other sex 
5. strong preference for playmates of the other sex 
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of 
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. 
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical 
intersex condition. 
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning. 66 
Although individuals may be diagnosed with GID, such a diagnosis 
is controversial and is not necessary for a person to be considered 
transgendered.67 An individual within any of the categories discussed 
above may be considered transgendered,68 and thus may be subjected 
to gender identity discrimination in employment. 
B. Forms of Discrimination 
In its broadest articulation, employment discrimination occurs 
when an employer takes adverse employment action against an 
applicant or employee. 69 This goes beyond circumstances where an 
employer fails to hire or terminates an individual-it also 
encompasses circumstances where the employer acts against the 
person's interests as they relate to "compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment .... "70 It can include actions which 
range from passing over the individual for a promotion, to failing to 
66. /d. at 581. 
67. See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2; Ken Hausman, Controversy Continues to Grow 
Over DSM's G/D Diagnosis, 38 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 14, July 18, 2003, at 25, 
available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/fulllpsychnews;38/14/25. 
68. See VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 2. A transgendered individual is defined as "a 
person ... who identifies with or expresses a gender identity that differs from the one 
which corresponds to the person's sex at birth." MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE 
DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transgender (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2009). 
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
70. /d. 
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provide paid leave where others receive it, or to giving an employee 
unfavorable working hours. 71 
In recent years, the federal courts have encountered a variety of 
circumstances in which transgendered individuals allege gender 
identity discrimination. 72 These include claims of sexual 
harassment/3 retaliation/4 termination/5 and refusal to hire due to an 
applicant's transgendered status.76 Each of these claims clearly falls 
within the definition of employment discrimination. 
Of course, not all discrimination is actionable. If a plaintiff is to 
succeed in a claim of employment discrimination, the employer's 
actions must be prohibited under either state or federal law. 77 States 
vary in the protections they afford to individuals. 78 In the federal 
system, Title VII outlines the classes of people protected from 
employment discrimination. 79 
III. CURRENT FEDERAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER 
IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Starting Point for Gender Identity Discrimination Claims 
Under Title VII 
When the idea of gender identity discrimination first reached the 
federal courts, there was little doubt as to whether transgendered 
individuals were protected under Title VII. The Ninth Circuit was 
the first appellate court to consider whether Title VII's prohibition 
against sex discrimination also prevented employers from 
discriminating based on gender identity. 80 The court responded to the 
theory with a resounding "no. " 81 
Ramona Holloway appealed to the Ninth Circuit after the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed 
71. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2004). 
72. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008); Smith, 378 F.3d at 
567-68; Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864. 869 (9th Cir. 2001). 
73. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082 (7th Cir. 2000); Nichols, 256 
F.3d at 869. 
74. See Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1 082; Smith, 378 F.3d at 569. 
75. See Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-WK, 2003 WL 21525058, 
at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003). 
76. See Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 295. 
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
78. See infra Part V. 
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
80. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977); see also 
VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1-2. 
81. See Holloway, 566 F.2d at 664. 
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her claim of gender identity discrimination for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 82 The District Court reasoned that gender identity is not 
a protected class under Title VII. 83 
Although Holloway began working for Arthur Andersen in 1969, 
she did not initially disclose her transgendered status. 84 It was not 
until after she received a promotion in February of 1974 that she 
informed her supervisor that she was receiving treatment "in 
preparation for anatomical sex change surgery."85 Four months later, 
she received her annual performance review, during which a 
company official suggested that she might "be happier at a new job 
where her transsexualism would be unknown."86 After the review, 
Holloway received a pay raise. 87 Then, in November of that year, 
Holloway made a request that her records be altered to reflect her 
new name.88 Arthur Andersen terminated her employment shortly 
thereafter.89 Holloway alleged that she was fired for being a 
transsexual and that the company's actions were unlawful under Title 
VII.9o 
Because the District Court dismissed Holloway's claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit only addressed the issue 
of whether transsexuality was protected under Title VII. 91 The court 
referred to the lack of legislative history relating to the use of the 
word "sex" in the statute and determined that Congress demonstrated 
no intent to give the term anything other than its traditional 
meaning. 92 It refused to expand the definition to protect 
transsexuals.93 Rather, it found that the prohibition against sex 
discrimination in employment existed to require employers to treat 
biological men and women equally.94 Under this interpretation, Title 
VII does not protect transgendered persons. 
82. I d. at 661. 
83. See id. at 662-63. 
84. Jd. at 661. 
85. /d. Holloway began female hormone treatments in 1970. ld. 
86. Jd. 
87. /d. 
88. /d. "Ramona Holloway" was, in fact, her new name. Id. When Holloway began 




92. /d. at 662-63. 
93. ld. at 663. 
94. /d. Although the court also acknowledged that Title VII allows men and women to be 
treated disparately if there is a bona fide relationship between the employment 
qualifications and an individual's sex (a "BFOQ"), the concept is irrelevant for 
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The Ninth Circuit was not alone in its interpretation of Title VII's 
protection as it pertained to gender identity.95 The Eighth Circuit, 
reached the same conclusion in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. ,96 
a 1982 case appealed from a grant of summary judgment. 97 Audra 
Sommers, a male to female transsexual, alleged she was 
discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII. 98 
Specifically, she claimed that her employer terminated her 
employment due to her status as "a female with the anatomical body 
of a male."99 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, 
finding that Title VII did not extend protection to those who are 
discriminated against because of their transsexuality. 100 In so finding, 
the court employed reasoning virtually identical to that of the Ninth 
Circuit. 101 
The Seventh Circuit followed suit when presented with the issue. 102 
It overturned a decision in the Northern District of Illinois that 
allowed recovery under Title VII to a plaintiff who was discriminated 
against for being a transsexual. 103 The case concerned an airline 
pilot, hired by Eastern Airlines as a male, who was terminated after 
she returned to work as a female. 104 The court narrowly defined the 
word "sex," determining that absent Congressional action to indicate 
otherwise, Title VII protects only those who are_ discriminated against 
for being biologically male or biologically female. 105 Having been 
purposes of this discussion. !d. Finding that gender identity discrimination is 
prohibited under Title VII would do no more than confer standing to those who claim 
they have been discriminated against for being transgendered. All established 
exceptions to Title VII, which occasionally permit discrimination to occur legally, 
would apply with equal force to transgendered persons. 
95. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Sommers 
v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982). 
96. 667 F.2d 748. 
97. /d. at 750. 
98. /d. at 749. 
99. /d. 
100. /d. 
I 0 l. /d. at 750. It also focused primarily on the dearth of legislative history relating to the 
word "sex" used in Title VII, proceeding to acknowledge that the primary purpose of 
the late addition to the statute was to ensure women be treated equally to men in 
employment. /d. As such, absent an express congressional intent to grant protection 
to transsexuals, no protection existed under Title VII. /d. 
102. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984). 
l 03. /d. at I 082, l 084. 
104. /d. at 1082-83. Karen Ulane was terminated despite the fact that she was able to 
retain her Federal Aviation Administration certification. /d. at 1083. 
l 05. See id. at l 087. 
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discriminated against for being a transsexual, Karen Ulane was not 
protected by the statute. 106 
The pattern in the federal circuits, after these three cases, was clear: 
transsexuals were not protected under Title VII. 107 The courts' 
interpretation further indicated that only an act of Congress could 
change this determination. 108 
B. The Turning Point ofPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins 109 
Although the federal courts agreed that Title VII afforded no 
protection against gender identity discrimination, this basic 
assumption changed in 1989. 110 At that time, the Supreme Court held 
that Title VII prohibits not only discrimination based on an 
individual's biological sex, but also discrimination based on a sex 
stereotype. 111 In essence, employers are not permitted to make an 
employment decision based on preconceived notions of how a man or 
a woman should behave. 112 
In its landmark decision of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 113 the 
Court considered the case of Ann Hopkins. 114 Hopkins was 
considered for a partnership at Price Waterhouse, a national 
accounting firm. 115 Rather than receiving a partnership, Hopkins was 
held over to be considered again the following year. 116 This occurred 
despite numerous glowing compliments from partners in her office, 
praising her character and job performance. 117 
106. /d. The Seventh Circuit also focused primarily on congressional intent to resolve the 
issue presented in the case. Id. at 1085. 
107. See id. at 1085; Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); 
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977). 
108. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("If Congress believes that transsexuals should enjoy the 
protection of Title VII, it may so provide. Until that time, however, we decline in 
behalf of the Congress to judicially expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII 
beyond its common and traditional interpretation."); Sommers, 667 F.2d at 750; 
Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662-63. 
109. 490 u.s. 228 (1989) 
110. See id. at 250; see also VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 3. 
111. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
112. See id. 
113. 490 u.s. 228. 
114. Id at 231. 
115. Id. at 231-32. 
116. /d. at 231. 
117. /d. at 234. Hopkins was recognized as having one of the best records in the preceding 
year "'in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership.'" /d. As 
an employee, she was described as an '"outstanding professional'" who had a "'deft 
touch, . . . strong character, independence and integrity."' /d. Her intellectual 
faculties were also generously praised. See id. 
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In addition to the positive remarks partners made about Hopkins, 
some concerns were also expressed. 118 Namely, some of her 
superiors viewed her as sometimes being "'overly aggressive, unduly 
harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff. "'119 Each of 
these points would seem legitimate if not for additional comments 
that indicated that the partners were concerned about these attributes 
solely because she was a woman. 120 Partners elaborated in their 
remarks about Hopkins by describing her as "'macho,"' stating that 
she "'overcompensated for being a woman,"' and suggesting that she 
go to charm school. 121 Perhaps most shocking of all, however, was 
the statement that if Hopkins wished to better her chances at 
achieving partnership, she should "'walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry. "'122 The Court, in a plurality opinion 123 
written by Justice Brennan, recognized this statement as the "coup de 
grace."124 
The Supreme Court proceeded to interpret Title VII's express 
terms, finding that an employer discriminates "because of' sex if 
"gender was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it 
was made."125 An individual need not prove that he or she was 
discriminated against directly due to his or her biological sex. 126 
Rather, the Court found that the person need only prove that the 
employer relied upon "sex-based considerations" when making its 
decision. 127 The Court accepted the District Court's determination 
that the partners' comments constituted sex stereotyping. 128 More 
118. !d. at 234-35. 
119. !d. at 235. 
120. See id. 
121. !d. Additional comments were made in which some partners criticized her for using 
profane language and one partner admitted that the real objection was that it was '"a 
lady using foul language.'" !d. Further, one of Hopkins' supporters was quoted as 
saying she '"ha[ d) matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner] 
candidate."' !d. 
122. !d. 
123. Although the opinion was a plurality, six of the nine Justices agreed that sex 
stereotyping does constitute discrimination "because of ... sex" under Title VII. See 
id. at 250-51 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 
272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
124. !d. at 235 (plurality opinion). 
125. !d. at 241. 
126. !d. 
127. !d. at 241-42. 
128. !d. at 251. 
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importantly, the Court refused to allow employers to engage in sex 
stereotyping when making employment decisions: 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for '[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of 
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes.' 129 
The status of gender identity discrimination under Title VII, 
previously so clear, 130 has been questioned following the decision in 
Price Waterhouse. 131 If sex stereotyping is prohibited under the 
statute, the question becomes whether, by discriminating against 
individuals due to their transgendered status, an employer is really 
subjecting them to a sex stereotype. 132 
C. The Current Circuit Split 
After the Supreme Court handed down the Price Waterhouse 
decision, the federal circuits began reexamining their approach to 
gender identity discrimination under Title VII. 133 At present, there is 
little consistency in the way transgendered individuals are treated in 
the federal courts. 134 The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the 
issue, and until it does, the question remains open whether Title VII 
makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of 
gender identity. 
1. Seventh Circuit 
Despite the holding in Price Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit 
maintains precedent holding that Title VII does not protect 
transgendered individuals. 135 The court has not directly reconsidered 
gender identity discrimination claims under the statute, but it has 
129. Jd. 
130. See supra Part III.A. 
131. VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1. 
132. The sex stereotype in question would be that biological males and females should live 
and present themselves as such full-time. 
133. Shannon H. Tan, When Steve Is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why Courts and 
Legislators Need to Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37 
STETSON L. REV. 579, 589-90 (2007). 
134. VanDeusen, supra note 40, at 1. 
135. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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made clear that prior precedent disallowing transgender 
discrimination claims is still valid. 136 The court quoted with approval 
language from Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 137 when faced with the 
question of whether a plaintiff can maintain a Title VII hostile work 
environment claim when he is harassed due to his sexual 
orientation. 138 
Edison Spearman worked for Ford Motor Company when the 
activity giving rise to his suit took place. 139 His coworkers engaged 
in conduct ranging from calling him a "'little bitch"' 140 to writing 
graffiti on a bulletin board reading "'Aids kills faggots dead ... 
RuPaul, RuSpearman. "'141 During the course of his employment, 
Spearman repeatedly filed complaints of harassment to his 
employer. 142 After Spearman filed suit, the district court granted 
Ford's motion for summary judgment, finding that Spearman did not 
show that he suffered adverse employment action. 143 The circuit 
court, in affirming the lower court's decision, placed particular 
emphasis on the perception that Spearman's coworkers were 
motivated to harass him because he was a homosexual rather than 
because he was a man. 144 The stereotypes he was subjected to were 
viewed as related directly to his sexual orientation rather than his 
biological sex. 145 The court viewed this as distinct from sex 
stereotyping and found that Title VII afforded Spearman no 
136. See id. at 1084. 
137. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
138. Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084. 
139. Jd. at 1082. 
140. Jd. 
141. Jd. at 1083. Spearman also complained ofbehavior from his foreman, Anthony Perez. 
Jd. Spearman alleged that he felt uncomfortable when, on two occasions, Perez 
offered to give him a hug. !d. He was further bothered by a hypothetical Perez used 
during a department meeting about sexual harassment. !d. The hypothetical was as 
follows: "Say for instance, Greg and Ed are in the back bringing in a coil, and Ed 
touches Greg in a way that made him feel uncomfortable, that can be a charge of 
sexual harassment." /d. Although Perez claimed the hypothetical referred to a 
different coworker, Spearman believed "Ed" was intended to be himself. !d. 
142. !d. at 1082. Spearman filed his first complaint in December of 1995, after which he 
did not file another until May 16, 1997. !d. A total of five complaints were filed 
between that date and May 4, 1998, when Spearman returned to work following a 
period of medical leave to find his toolbox destroyed and his tools stolen. !d. at 1082-
84. At this point, Spearman filed suit against Ford Motor Company, alleging that the 
company violated Title VII. !d. at 1084. 
143. /d. 
144. !d. at 1085-86. 
145. I d. at 1086. 
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protection. 146 In so finding, it emphasized that Title VII "does not 
prohibit harassment in general or of one's homosexuality in 
particular."147 In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs cannot maintain a 
Title VII action for discrimination without directly connecting the 
employer's conduct to either their biological sex or a related 
stereotype. 148 
Although Spearman focused on discrimination based on sexual 
orientation rather than gender identity, district courts within the 
Seventh Circuit regard it as effectively affirming the Ulane 
decision. 149 Because Spearman was decided in 2000, it is seen to 
demonstrate that Price Waterhouse does not alter the analysis of 
transgender claims under Title VII. 150 
2. Ninth Circuit 
Since the Supreme Court decided. Price Waterhouse, the Ninth 
Circuit has not had occasion to address directly the question of 
whether transgendered individuals are also protected under the 
statute. However, the court has clearly indicated that it will now give 
a broader interpretation to the word "sex."151 The court's previous 
analysis in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 152 is no longer 
considered valid. 153 In Schwenk v. Hartford, 154 the Ninth Circuit 
146. See id. 
147. /d. 
148. See id. ("Because Spearman was not harassed because of his sex, his hostile 
environment claim fails.") (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 78 (1998)). 
149. See Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-HIK, 2003 WL 21525058, 
at *3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003). 
150. See id.; see also Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A 00-3114, 2002 WL 
31098541, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (citing Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084-85) 
(distinguishing a claim based on a sex stereotype from one based on an individual's 
gender identity; the former is protected under Price Waterhouse while the latter is 
not). 
151. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Schwenk 
v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); cf Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend protection of Title VII 
to transsexuals because discrimination against transsexuals is on the basis of"gender" 
rather than "sex."). 
152. 566 F.2d 659. 
153. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201. The Ninth Circuit did not expressly overrule its prior 
holding in Holloway because a different question was before the court under a 
different statute, the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMV A). /d. at 1194-95. 
However, the court analogized Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination to the 
GMV A, acknowledging that the term "sex" extends beyond pure biological sex. /d. at 
152 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
analogized the meaning of "sex" under Title VII to the Gender 
Motivated Violence Act. 155 In doing so, it acknowledged that, after 
Price Waterhouse, the terms "sex" and "gender" are interchangeable 
for purposes of Title VII analysis. 156 When people endure disparate 
treatment due to their transgendered status, it can constitute sex 
discrimination. 157 If a man is discriminated against for appearing 
feminine, he is effectively subjected to the gender stereotype that 
only women, and not men, should be feminine. 158 The court did not 
hold that discrimination on the basis of gender identity is forbidden 
under Title VII. 159 By acknowledging a broad definition of "sex," 
however, it provided future plaintiffs with the groundwork necessary 
for transgender discrimination claims to succeed in the Ninth Circuit. 
One year after the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the broadened 
definition of "sex" under Title VII, it faced a case of sex 
stereotyping. 160 Antonio Sanchez claimed he was harassed for failing 
to meet coworkers' views of how a man should behave. 161 His 
coworkers and supervisor continually referred to him in the feminine 
and mocked him for being too effeminate. 162 
Sanchez cited the holding of Price Waterhouse, contending that 
imposing a sex stereotype on a man is prohibited in the same way 
that imposing one on a woman is barred. 163 The court agreed with his 
interpretation. 164 The court further concluded that the harassment 
Sanchez's coworkers and supervisor subjected him to was, in fact, 
closely related to sex. 165 He was perceived as being too feminine, and 
suffered constant ridicule as a result. 166 Because the harassment 
1201 ("The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been 
overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."). 
154. 204 F.3d 1187. 
155. !d. 
156. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001). 
161. !d. 
162. !d. at 870. Males who worked with Nichols ridiculed him for carrying himself'"like 
a woman.'" !d. They further harassed him by calling him a "'faggot"' and a 
'"fucking female whore."' !d. 
163. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874. 
164. !d. at 874-75. 
165. !d. at 874. 
166. !d. The court found it significant that Sanchez's supervisor and coworkers chose 
feminine pronouns with which to taunt him. !d. Sanchez's perceived femininity is 
further underlined by the fact that "the most vulgar name-calling directed at [him] was 
cast in female terms." !d. 
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stemmed from a sex stereotype, that men should not be effeminate, it 
clearly violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 167 
To date, the Ninth Circuit has not officially recognized gender 
identity discrimination claims under Title VII. The court's recent 
line of precedent does, however, provide an expansive interpretation 
of the word "sex" in Title VII. 168 At a minimum, sex stereotyping 
claims fall firmly within those which can succeed. 169 It remains to be 
seen whether transgendered individuals will find themselves 
protected in the Ninth Circuit under a sex stereotyping theory. 
A transgendered person may claim to be discriminated against for 
failure to conform to a preconceived sex or gender stereotype. 170 A 
biological male or female will often be expected to live as that sex; 
by choosing to live otherwise, the person fails to meet that 
stereotype. 171 It would appear that, if a transgendered, biological 
male claims his employer viewed him as too feminine and 
discriminated as a result, the claim would be actionable under Title 
VII despite his transgendered status. 172 The same would be true for a 
transgendered, biological female who is viewed as too masculine. 173 
Until this theory is tested in court, however, protection against gender 
identity discrimination under Title VII cannot be assured in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
3. Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the issue of gender identity 
discrimination under Title VII in 2004, 174 fifteen years after the 
Supreme Court acknowledged sex stereotyping as actionable under 
Title Vll. 175 When it considered the issue of whether transgendered 
individuals are protected under the prohibition against sex 
discrimination, it became the first federal appellate court to explicitly 
hold that Title VII does extend such protection. 176 It reversed a 
decision by the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio which 
had dismissed Jimmie Smith's complaint. 177 
167. /d. at 875 ("Under Price Waterhouse, Sanchez must prevail."). 
168. See, e.g., id. at 864; Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
169. See Nichols, 256 F.3d 864. 
170. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
171. See id. 
172. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874. 
173. See id. 
174. Smith v. City ofSa1em, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
175. See id.; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
176. Smith, 378 F.3d 566; Tan, supra note 133, at 589. 
177. Smith, 378 F.3d at 566. 
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Smith was employed by the Salem Fire Department for seven years 
without incident. 178 Although born a biological male, he was 
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID). 179 Upon receiving 
the diagnosis, Smith decided to begin "expressing a more feminine 
appearance on a full time basis" not only in his private life, but also 
at work. 180 Shortly thereafter, Smith's coworkers began asking him 
questions about and commenting on his physical appearance. 181 
Smith reacted to his coworkers' inquiries and comments by 
speaking to his supervisor, Thomas Eastek, and disclosing his GID 
diagnosis. 182 He informed Eastek that he was presenting himself in a 
more feminine way as part of his treatment and that he would likely 
eventually undergo surgical gender reassignment. 183 Smith made 
clear that his intent in disclosing the information was to preemptively 
respond to any questions Eastek had about his recent change in 
appearance, and to allow Eastek to respond to his coworkers' 
comments. 184 He specifically requested, however, that the substance 
of the conversation not be disclosed to any of Eastek's supervisors-
particularly Walter Greenamyer. 185 Despite this request, Eastek soon 
informed Greenamyer about Smith's GID diagnosis. 186 Shortly 
thereafter, Greenamyer attended multiple meetings intending to 
develop a plan to terminate Smith for his transsexuality. 187 
Smith initiated legal proceedings against the City of Salem after he 
was informed of the plan to terminate him for being a transsexual. 188 
He alleged that the Fire Department engaged in sex discrimination 
178. Jd. at 568. 
179. I d.; see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
180. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. Smith's decision was consistent with recognized protocol for 
treating Gender Identity Disorder (GID): I d. 
181. I d. Smith's coworkers did not believe his appearance and mannerisms were 






187. Jd. Greenamyer met with both the City of Salem's Executive Body and the City's 
Law Director to discuss the issue. I d. 
188. Jd. at 569. Ultimately, the plan devised would require Smith to submit to three 
psychological evaluations with physicians chosen by the City, under the hope that he 
would refuse or choose to resign. Jd. If he refused the evaluations, he would be 
terminated on grounds of insubordination. ld. Salem· Safety Director Henry L. 
Willard informed Smith of these intentions, prompting Smith to take preemptive 
action against his ultimate termination. I d. 
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and retaliation in violation of Title VII. 189 The district court 
dismissed the action, but was overruled on appeal. 190 
The Sixth Circuit focused on the analysis in Price Waterhouse 
when evaluating Smith's sex discrimination claim. 191 Whereas the 
district court was dismissive of Smith's sex stereotyping theory, 192 the 
appellate court considered it valid. 193 Smith claimed his coworkers 
and superiors reacted negatively to him because he was not masculine 
enough. 194 The court found it sufficient, for purposes of a Title VII 
sex stereotyping claim, that Smith alleged the motivating factor 
behind his employers' actions to be a preconceived stereotype of how 
a man should appear and behave, to which Smith did not conform. 195 
In making its decision, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged and 
dismissed the series of federal cases permitting transgender 
discrimination under Title VII as being effectively overruled. 196 
Although prior jurisprudence indicated that only discrimination based 
on biological sex was prohibited by the statute, Price Waterhouse 
definitively changed the interpretation of the word "sex." 197 The use 
of any sex stereotype in making employment decisions was found 
impermissible under Title VII. 198 Thus, people who are subjected to 
the stereotype because they are transgendered are no longer 
prevented from invoking statutory protection. 199 
Less than one year after deciding Smith v. City of Salem,200 the 
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding that transgendered persons are 
189. /d. 
190. !d. at 566. Initially, Smith proceeded against the City of Salem through the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. !d. at 569. Greenamyer responded by 
suspending Smith for one twenty-four hour shift, allegedly because Smith violated 
either a City or fire department policy. !d. Ultimately, Smith filed his suit in federal 
district court. !d. 
191. Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-72. 
192. See id. at 571. The district court essentially found that Smith's true claim was not one 
of sex stereotyping, but that he was discriminated against for being transsexual. See 
id. 
193. !d. at 575. 
194. !d. at 572. 
195. !d. 
196. /d. at 572-73. See also supra Part liLA-B. 
197. See Smith, 378 F.3d at 573-74. Following the Supreme Court's decision in 1989, 
gender-based discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. /d. As a result, an employer 
who subjects an applicant or employee to a sex-based stereotype in making an 
employment decision violates the statute. See id. 
198. /d. at 574-75. 
199. See id. at 575. 
200. 378 F.3d 566. 
156 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
protected under Title VIL201 The court saw no need to re-analyze the 
issue, instead deferring to its previous holding. 202 Although the 
opinion in Barnes v. City of CincinnatF03 does not delve into the 
intricacies of transgender rights under the statute, it makes clear that 
in the Sixth Circuit, transsexuality does not bar a Title VII claim of 
sex discrimination.204 The Sixth Circuit is currently the only federal 
court in which there is a clear holding that allows claims of gender 
identity discrimination to proceed under a Title VII sex stereotyping 
theory.205 
N. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION 
From the split in the federal circuits it is clear that there is 
significant confusion regarding the interpretation of the federal 
government's primary employment discrimination statute.206 Without 
the Supreme Court's interpretation to provide clarity, it falls on 
Congress to determine trans gender employment rights. 207 In 2007, 
two potential comprehensive non-discrimination acts were proposed 
in the House of Representatives. 208 
A. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
The 11 Oth Congress first attempted to pass legislation protecting 
transgendered individuals from discrimination in the form of H.R. 
2015.209 On March 24, 2007, Representative Barney Frank of 
Massachusetts proposed a comprehensive ace10 that would thereafter 
prohibit employment discrimination based on an individual's "actual 
201. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
202. Id. at 737 ('"Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such 
as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has 
suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity."' (quoting 
Smith, 378 F.3d at 575)). 
203. 401 F.3d 729. 
204. See id. at 737 ("In Smith, this court held that the district court erred in granting a 
motion to dismiss by holding that transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to Title VII 
protections .... "(citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 575)). 
205. See id.; Smith, 378 F.3d at 570-75. 
206. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
207. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007, H.R. 2015, !lOth Cong. (2007); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007). 
208. See H.R. 2015; H.R. 3685. 
209. See H.R. 2015. 
210. H.R. REP. No. 110-406, pt. I, at 9 (2007). 
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or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity."211 This bill never 
reached a vote in the House ofRepresentatives.212 
On September 28, 2007, Representative Frank, with Representative 
Deborah Pryce, proposed a new version of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).213 They chose to propose a new act 
after determining that a comprehensive bill would not gain enough 
votes to pass the House.214 The new ENDA does not include "gender 
identity" as a protected class, but instead only bars discrimination on 
the basis of an individual's "actual or perceived sexual 
orientation."215 The House of Representatives passed the legislation 
by a vote of 235 to 184 on November 7, 2007. 216 Although the bill 
was read in the Senate twice, it was not voted on by the Senate before 
the 110th Congress concluded.217 
B. Public Response to the Amended ENDA 
1. Criticisms in the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered 
Community 
The revised ENDA has been criticized for providing too narrow 
protections with too broad of a religious exemption.218 Although 
some individuals view the act as a positive "historic milestone,"219 
much of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) 
community opposes the amended ENDA because it does not include 
gender identity as a protected class. 22° For example, the National 
211. H.R. 2015. 
212. See H.R. REP. No. 110-406, pt. 1, at 49-52. 
213. !d. at 9. 
214. Christine Daniels, Op-Ed., Civil rights for LGB ... and T, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10,2007, 
at A21, available at http:/ /www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-oe-daniels 
I Ooct 10,0,3386369 .story. 
215. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007). 
216. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 1057 (Nov. 7, 2007), 
available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007 /roll! 057 .xml. 
217. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, H.R. 3685-SUMMARY OF ALL ACTIONS, available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/search.html (search "H.R. 3685"; then follow "All 
Congressional Actions") (last visited Sept. 9, 2009). 
218. See Kathleen Clark, SALT Statement on Employment Non-Discrimination Act (HR 
3685) and Call for Action, Soc'Y OF AM. LAW TEACHERS, Oct. 17,2007, available at 
http://www.saltlaw.org/-salt2007 /files/uploads/! 0-17-07SAL T _Statement_ on_ 
Employment _Non_O.pdf. 
219. See Kathi Wolfe, Editorial, Another Voice: House Passage of the Anti-Discrimination 
Bill Is a Historic Milestone, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Nov. 17, 2007, at 
Al8. 
220. See Clark, supra note 218. 
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Center for Lesbian Rights has viewed this attempt at incremental 
protection with scorn, stating, "[ w ]e are being asked what no 
community involved in a civil rights struggle should ever be asked to 
do: leave part of our community behind in order to secure an advance 
for some. "221 
It is not just activist organizations that are displeased with 
Representative Frank's decision to exclude protection for 
transgendered individuals. Joumalists222 and private citizens223 alike 
have spoken out against the new bill. While most admit that 
minorities have historically gained civil rights in incremental steps,224 
few accept Representative Frank's decision to leave an entire group 
behind as a step forward in the quest for comprehensive civil 
rights.225 Rather, many consider Representative Frank's actions a 
betrayal.226 The new bill does not promote all-inclusive civil rights, 
but instead sets transgendered individuals back in their quest to 
obtain equal treatment under federal law. 
2. Concerns that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act is Over-
Broad 
Although much of the LGBT community finds the ENDA to be 
insufficient, it would be a fallacy to assume that all, or even most, of 
the bill's criticism stems from its failure to protect against gender 
identity discrimination. Opponents of the bill have also criticized it 
as being too broad. 227 They fear that granting federal protection 
against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
will result in frivolous lawsuits.228 Republicans, such as Ron Paul, 
even believe the bill sweeps widely enough to effectively impose a 
quota on employers.229 This fear, however, is in direct conflict with 
221. NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT, 
http:/ /www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/ENDA _ Talking_Points _formatted_ FINAL.p 
df (last visited Sept. 2, 2009). 
222. See Daniels, supra note 214. 
223. See Matt Forman, Letter to the Editor, Falling Short on Equal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ll/16/opinionllwebl6gay.html. 
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. See id. Journalist Christine Daniels describes Representative Frank's actions as 
having "low-bridg[ed]" the transgender community. Daniels, supra note 214 
(explaining that "low bridg[ing]" is "the act of suddenly taking out a player's legs ... 
a cheap and devious move .... "). 
227. See Editorial, Test ofTolerance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,2007, at A24. 
228. See Wolfe, supra note 219. 
229. See Tara Bozick, Anti-Discrimination Bill Against Gays Making Its Way Through 
Congress, VICTORIA ADVOCATE (Victoria, Tex.), Dec. 6, 2007, at A4 ("Paul, a 
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the bill's express provision in subsection (f), entitled "No Preferential 
Treatment or Quotas," which provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted to 
require or permit-
( 1) any covered entity to grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group because of the actual or 
perceived sexual orientation of such individual or group on 
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the 
total number or percentage of persons of any actual or 
perceived sexual orientation employed by any employer, 
referred or classified for employment by any employment 
agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or 
classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or 
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, 
in comparison with the total number or percentage of 
persons of such actual or perceived sexual orientation in any 
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available 
work force in any community, State, section, or other area; 
or 
(2) the adoption or implementation by a covered entity of 
a quota on the basis of actual or perceived sexual 
orientation. 230 · 
C. Legal Repercussions of the Amended Act 
1. The Possibility of Transgendered Protection 
Despite the public criticism of the ENDA being too narrow in its 
protections, it is possible that a bill which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of "perceived sexual orientation" might provide protection 
to transgendered individuals.231 However, it would aid transgendered 
persons only when an employer believes that the applicant or 
employee is not heterosexual. 232 Even then, it is unclear to what 
extent protection would be granted.233 The term "perceived" is not 
Republican, believes ... employers would hire [homosexual or bisexual] people to 
avoid being charged with discrimination."). 
230. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, llOth Cong. § 4(f) (2007). 
231. /d. at § 4(a). 
232. See Amy M. Scott, Expanding Employer Liability: Mental Health Parity and Sexual 
Orientation Protections, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REv., Dec. 2007, at 29. 
233. See id. 
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defined in House Bill 3685.234 Without a definition to explain what it 
means to discriminate based on an individual's "perceived sexual 
orientation," it is likely that the courts would have difficulty 
determining who Congress intended to protect. 235 
2. Potential Judicial Exclusion of Gender Identity as a Protected 
Class 
While some possibility of trans gender protection under House Bill 
3685 or a similarly phrased bill exists, it is more likely that the 
passage of an act protecting only sexual orientation will wreak havoc 
on protections which transgendered persons currently receive in some 
circuits?36 To date, the federal appellate courts have been called on 
only to determine whether Title VII's prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of sex also extends protection to 
transgendered individuals.237 The circuits which allow claims of 
gender identity discrimination to proceed, do so by finding that an 
employer imposed a sex stereotype on a given applicant or 
employee.238 The courts have not, however, had to contend with a 
situation in which Congress has considered, and effectively rejected, 
a bill barring employers from discriminating based on gender 
identity. Should a bill similar to H.R. 3685 be enacted, this is 
precisely the situation the courts will face next. 
The maxim of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius stands for the proposition that when Congress explicitly 
mentions one possibility in a statute, it is presumed to have excluded 
all others.239 This maxim is somewhat limited, as it "has force only 
when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or 
series;' justifying the inference that items not mentioned were 
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence."240 In the case of 
employment discrimination protection, it is clear that the enumerated 
protected classes are members of such an "associated group or 
series."241 Should Congress amend Title VII to include sexual 
orientation, but not gender identity, as a protected class, the maxim 
234. See H.R. 3685; Scott, supra note 232, at 29. 
235. See Scott, supra note 232, at 29. 
236. See supra Part III.C. 
237. See supra Part III.C. 
238. See supra Part III.C.3. 
239. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (citing United States v. 
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). 
240. ld (quoting Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65). 
241. ld; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (2006). 
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would apply.242 The history of H.R. 2015 would provide explicit 
proof that Congress has both considered and rejected the possibility 
of banning employment discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity. 243 
What is unclear is whether the Supreme Court would extend the 
maxim where there are multiple statutes legislating on the same 
matter. The proposed ENDAs would not have amended Title VII, 
but would have expanded employment discrimination protection by 
way of an entirely separate statute.244 However, Representative 
Frank's deliberate exclusion of gender identity as a protected class 
when proposing H.R. 3685245 may prompt the Supreme Court to 
conclude that gender identity is not protected either under Title VII, 
should the issue reach the Court, or under any future act banning 
sexual orientation discrimination. Such a judicial presumption would 
devastate transgender rights currently acknowledged m some 
circuits. 246 
V. THE STATE RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION 
Although Congress has yet to include gender identity as a protected 
class under Title VII or a separate statute, 247 some states have 
recognized and assumed the duty to grant protection. 248 At present, 
thirteen states and Washington, D.C., protect individuals against 
discrimination based on their gender expression. 249 Amongst the 
most recent states to grant protection to transgendered individuals are 
Iowa/50 New Jersey/51 and Colorado.252 In 2007, all three of these 
242. See Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 168 (citing Vonn, 535 U.S. at 65). 
243. Daniels, supra note 214, at A2l. Representative Frank did not merely propose 
alternative legislation after he initially sponsored H.R. 2015. !d. Rather, he took note 
that preliminary polls showed that the bill would not pass if it came to a vote in the 
House of Representatives in its original form, and subsequently proposed legislation 
that deliberately excluded "gender identity" from its protection. /d. 
244. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of2007, H.R. 3685, !lOth Cong. (2007). 
245. Daniels, supra note 214, at A21. 
246. See supra Part III.C. 
247. See supra Part IV.A. 
248. Michelle Garcia, ENDA, State by State, THE ADVOCATE (Los Angeles, Cal.), Nov. 20, 
2007, available at http:www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id= 171535 
165. 
249. /d. 
250. See IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6(l)(a)-(c) (West Supp. 2009). 
251. See N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12(a}-(c) (West Supp. 2009). 
252. See Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-401(7.5), -402(l)(a)-{c) (West 2008 & West 
Supp. 2008). 
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states enacted new legislation explicitly prohibiting gender identity 
discrimination. 253 
Beginning July 1, 2007/54 Iowa's Civil Rights Act provided 
comprehensive protection against discrimination.255 Whereas 
previously the Act closely resembled Title VII, it now includes both 
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes. 256 
Further, the Act gives expansive definitions to each of these newly 
acknowledged categories.257 Sexual orientation includes an 
individual's actual or perceived sexual preference. 258 Gender 
identity, meanwhile, is defined as being "a gender-related identity of 
a person, regardless of the person's assigned sex at birth."259 Under 
the Act, it is now illegal for an employer, subject to specific 
exemptions/60 to refuse to hire, terminate, or otherwise discriminate 
against an individual due to his or her sexual orientation or gender 
identity. 261 
Like Iowa, New Jersey has amended its existing non-discrimination 
act to provide protection against gender identity discrimination. 262 
Effective June 17, 2007, the State's "Law Against Discrimination"263 
bars employers from discriminating on the basis of an individual's 
gender identity or expression. 264 The statute defines "[g]ender 
identity or expression" as "having or being perceived as having a 
gender related identity or expression whether or not stereotypically 
associated with a person's assigned sex at birth."265 This expansive 
253. State Legislative Action Expanding Protected Classes for Employment Discrimination 
to Include Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, NEWS FLASH (Koley Jessen, P.C., 
Omaha, Neb.), Aug. 2007, at 1-2, http://www.koleyjessen.com/assets/Newsflash 
August2007.pdf[hereinafter State Legislative Action]. 
254. !d. at I. 
255. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009). 
256. !d.§ 216.6(l)(a). 
257. !d.§ 216.2(10), (14). 
258. See id. § 216.2(14). 
259. !d.§ 216.2(10). 
260. !d. § 216.6(6). All exemptions save one apply to all protected groups under the Act. 
!d. The Act does contain a religious exemption, however, which only allows a bona 
fide religious organization to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, so long as the employer's actions are related to a "bona fide religious 
purpose." !d. § 216.6(6)(d). 
261. !d.§ 216.6(l)(a). 
262. State Legislative Action, supra note 253, at 2. 
263. !d. 
264. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12(a) (West 2009). 
265. !d. § 10:5-5(rr). 
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definition266 grants protection to transsexuals, transvestites, and other 
transgenderists where it did not previously exist in New Jersey. 
The State of Colorado adopted a different approach to gender 
identity discrimination than either Iowa267 or New Jersey.268 Its 
employment non-discrimination statute does not include gender 
identity as a protected class, but does include sexual orientation. 269 
The term "sexual orientation," however, is given an expansive 
definition: "a person's orientation toward heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, bisexuality, or transgender status or an employer's 
perception thereof.'mo Through this broad definition of sexual 
orientation, the Colorado legislature explicitly prohibits 
discrimination against transgendered individuals.271 
VI. MARYLAND'S RESPONSE TO GENDER IDENTITY 
DISCRIMINATION 
A. Current State-Level Legislation 
At present, the State of Maryland is not among those that include 
gender identity as a protected class. 272 Although Maryland does 
prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation, 
the legislature has not yet seen fit to extend similar protections to the 
transgendered community.273 Unlike Colorado, Maryland currently 
defines sexual orientation narrowly: "the identification of an 
individual as to male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, or 
bisexuality. "274 
Although gender identity is not yet a protected class in Maryland, 
attempts have been made by delegates in the state legislature to 
remedy that fact. 275 On March 3, 2008, a bill was introduced in the 
Maryland House of Delegates with the purpose of adding "gender 
266. See supra Part I LA. 
267. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009). 
268. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-12 (West Supp. 2009). 
269. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 24-34-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
270. Id. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2008). 
271. Seeid. 
272. See Mo. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 20-606(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2009). 
273. See id. 
274. Compare Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-401(7.5) (West 2008) (including an 
individual's transgendered status within the definition of sexual orientation), with Mo. 
CoDE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-lOl(f) (LexisNexis 2009) (limiting sexual orientation 
to the concepts of heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality). 
275. See H.B. 1598, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008). 
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identity" to the enumerated protected classes. 276 If passed, the bill 
would have defined gender identity as being "a gender-related 
identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of an individual 
regardless of the individual's assigned sex at birth."277 Employers 
would be prohibited from refusing to hire, terminating, or otherwise 
discriminating against an employee or applicant based on gender 
identity. 278 This bill died when the Maryland General Assembly 
adjourned on April 7, 2008.279 
In February of2009, legislation virtually identical to that before the 
House of Delegates in 2008 was again proposed, this time in both the 
House of Delegates280 and the Maryland State Senate. 281 Although 
the proposed bills sought to expand the protected classes in Maryland 
to include gender identity/82 defined in a manner identical to the 
2008 proposal,283 both bills died again when the legislative session 
ended on April 13, 2009.284 
B. Local Protection 
Within the State of Maryland, two local jurisdictions285 provide 
protection against discrimination beyond that granted by the state. 286 
Baltimore City explicitly bars employers from discriminating based 
276. Jd. The proposed bill was similar in form to that enacted in Iowa in 2007. Compare 
IOWA CODE ANN.§ 216.6 (West Supp. 2009), with Md. H.B. 1598. 
277. Md H.B. 1598. 
278. Id. 
279. Maryland HB 1598/SB 976, https://www.hrc.org/issues/transgender/9348.htm (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2009). 
280. H.B. 474,2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009). 
281. S.B. 566, 2009 Leg., 426th Sess. (Md. 2009). 
282. The House Bill was proposed on February 4, 2009. Md. H.B. 474. The Senate Bill 
was proposed on February 6, 2009. Md. S.B. 566. 
283. Compare H.B. 1598, 2008 Leg., 425th Sess. (Md. 2008), with H.B. 474, 2009 Leg., 
426th Sess. (Md. 2009). 
284. Maryland HB 474/SB 566, http://www.hrc.org/issues/transgender/12563.htm (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2009). Before it died at the end of the legislative session, the House 
Bill was sponsored by 67 of Maryland's 141 delegates. HousE BILL 474, 
http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/billfilelhb0474.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2009); 
WELCOME TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, http://mlis.state.md.us/#gena (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2009). The Senate Bill was sponsored by 14 of the 47 state Senators. 
SENATE BILL 566, http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/billfile/SB0566.htm (last visited Aug. 
29, 2009); WELCOME TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
http://mlis.state.md.us/#gena (last visited Aug. 29, 2009). 
285. See supra note 57. 
286. See BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2003); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Mo., 
CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009). 
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on an individual's gender identity or expression.287 The ordinance, 
which became effective January 5, 2003/88 defines gender identity or 
expression as "an individual's having or being perceived as having a 
gender-related self-identity, self-image, appearance, expression, or 
behavior, whether or not those gender-related characteristics differ 
from those associated with the individual's assigned sex at birth. "289 
Baltimore City is not the only Maryland jurisdiction to legislate on 
the issue of gender identity discrimination. In 2007, the Montgomery 
County Council unanimously passed an ordinance expanding county 
protections to include gender identity as a protected class.Z90 The 
ordinance prohibits an employer from engaging in discrimination 
based on gender identity. 291 Montgomery County defines gender 
identity in a manner virtually identical to Baltimore City's 
ordinance. 292 
Both the Baltimore City93 and the Montgomery County294 
ordinances are prime examples of the form of protection which 
transgendered individuals should receive. It is important to 
remember, however, that these comprehensive non-discrimination 
statutes only apply to employers in the jurisdictions in which they 
were passed. An individual will only be protected when employed 
by, or applying to, an employer within the borders of these 
progressive jurisdictions. It is still necessary for the Maryland 
General Assembly to legislate on the issue of gender identity 
287. BALTIMORE CITY, Mo., CODE art. 4, § 3-1 (2008). 
288. CMTY. RELATIONS COMM'N, DISCRIMINATION IS ILLEGAL! TRANSGENDER PEOPLE HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION (2003), 
http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/community/downloads/1208/Transgender 
_Brochure_ Green.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). 
289. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4, § l-1(1-1) (2003). 
290. Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Task Force Expresses 
Disappointment in Montgomery County Court Decision (July 24, 2008), 
http://www. thetaskforce.org/press/releases/pr _ 072408. 
291. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009). 
292. Compare BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4, § 1-1(1-1) (2008) (defining gender 
identity as "an individual's having or being perceived as having a gender-related self-
identity, self-image, appearance, expression, or behavior, whether or not those gender-
related characteristics differ from those associated with the individual's assigned sex 
at birth."), with MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-6 (2008) (defining 
gender identity as "an individual's actual or perceived gender, including a person's 
gender-related appearance, expression, image, identity, or behavior, whether or not 
those gender-related characteristics differ from the characteristics customarily 
associated with the person's assigned sex at birth."). 
293. BALTIMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 4 § 3-1 (2009). 
294. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 27, § 27-19 (2009). 
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discrimination. Transgendered citizens m Maryland will not 
adequately be protected otherwise. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Gender identity discrimination is a significant problem in the 
United States. Multiple studies have shown that approximately fifty 
percent of transgendered individuals report having experienced 
discrimination in the workplace.295 Yet, to date, transgendered 
individuals receive, at best, inconsistent protection under Title VII. 296 
Although there have been attempts to expand federal protection 
against employment discrimination, these efforts are insufficient both 
in immediacy and comprehensiveness. 297 The delayed action on 
proposed federal House Bill 3685, coupled with the absence of 
protection against gender identity discrimination, leaves a hole in the 
law.298 If an act such as the proposed ENDA passes, transgendered 
individuals will be even less certain of protection than if it does 
not. 299 Passage of an act that establishes sexual orientation as a 
protected class while failing to include gender identity may even 
create a judicial presumption that Congress intended to exclude 
gender identity from receiving federal protection. 300 
Due to Congress's failure to enact federal legislation, states have 
assumed the responsibility of protecting transgendered citizens.301 
Maryland, however, has yet to include gender identity as a protected 
class.302 It has therefore fallen on Maryland's local jurisdictions to 
grant comprehensive civil rights to citizens. 303 
In light of Congress's failure to prohibit employment 
discrimination against the LGBT community, the Maryland General 
Assembly must weigh in on the side of protection. The state 
legislature should follow Montgomery County's model304 by 
providing broad protections that include gender identity as a 
protected class in Maryland. To do otherwise separates the LGBT 
295. Kyler W. Broadus, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Protections for 
Transgender People, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 93 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, 
& Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006). 
296. See supra Part III. C. 
297. See supra Part IV.A-B. 
298. See supra Part IV.C.l-2. 
299. See supra Part IV.C.l-2. 
300. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
301. See supra Part V. 
302. See supra Part VI .A. 
303. See supra Part Vl.B. 
304. See supra Part VI. B. 
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community into two groups, causing individuals who share one cause 
to receive disparate treatment. Existing state law, though it provides 
greater protection than that available on a federal level, 305 remains 
insufficient. The law is designed to protect all citizens, not to classify 
them in a manner that allows discrimination to occur. The only way 
to provide adequate protection in Maryland is for the state legislature 
to pass a comprehensive non-discrimination statute. This will ensure 
that employers make legitimate employment decisions rather than 
taking action against individuals based solely on animus toward 
others' lifestyles. 
Courtney J. Jefferson 
305. Compare Mo. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-606(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2009), with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (2006). 
